Environmental and financial consequences of Site C dam

Ruth-Ann Darnall
Vancouver Sun
22-Apr-2004

On April 8 in The Sun, David Black, chair of the B.C. Progress Board, presented his case for building Site C, a 900-megawatt hydro-electric dam on the Peace River in northeastern British Columbia. It sounded too good to be true. It probably is.

There is more to the Site C story, much of it found in recent BC Hydro documents and in the conclusions of the B.C. Utilities Commission when it considered the Site C project in the early 1980s.

BC Hydro estimates that the project would leave a footprint of 12,800 acres (5,125 hectares). Of this, 10,000 acres (3,940 hectares) is judged by both Hydro and the commission to be farmland of agricultural significance -- not the 500 hectares estimated by the B.C. Progress Board.

Much of this is Class 1 agricultural land, with Class 1 climate capability, an increasingly rare commodity in British Columbia. Not only would the acreage be lost, but any Class 1 land that remained would have to be downgraded to Class 2 because of climate change brought about by the impoundment. In the late 1970's, BC Hydro introduced a "passive land acquisition program," under which it acquired about 7,500 acres. The remainder of the titled land is held by private individuals.

The Progress Board dismissed the environmental consequences of Site C because "there are no salmon in the river." In fact, the unique wildlife values of the Peace Valley were recognized by the South Peace Land Resource Management Plan, which laid out the Peace Boudreau Protected Area on the south side of the Peace River. The valley provides crucial wintering and calving habitat for ungulates and is a critical nesting area for warblers and an important flyway for 70 species of birds and waterfowl.

So let us be clear: The environmental footprint of Site C is not inconsequential.

There are some things man cannot put into economic terms. The Peace Valley is one of them. Yet in these times, neither environmental consequences nor pristine beauty will be the basis upon which Site C will be judged; Site C will stand or fall on economic considerations.

British Columbians must hope that once again, the utilities commission will provide the acuity and vigilance needed to determine truly and fairly the full costs of this mega-project. Black maintains that the dam "can be 100 per-cent financed by pre-selling the power for export, resulting in little financial risk."

California is the market mentioned. Have British Columbians forgotten that California received $455 million worth of electricity from BC Hydro in 2001 that it has steadfastly refused to pay for? Having forgotten that they asked for help to keep the lights on, California accuses B.C. of somehow being at fault and overbilling them. Not only did the California companies refuse to pay, BC Hydro was forced to defend itself from attempts to sue for refunds.

Despite a ruling last year by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that BC Hydro had done nothing wrong, the bill remains unpaid. Is this the market into which British Columbians wish to entrust a "self-financed" $2.2-billion dollar investment? What have been the legal costs of defending BC Hydro and chasing that $455 million? The Progress Board opines that "financial returns can be guaranteed." Guaranteed by whom? In the end, any financial returns will be guaranteed by B.C. ratepayers.

Something that seems too good to be true usually is. Such is the scenario laid out by Black.

Make no mistake: Site C is not without environmental consequences, nor financial risk.

Ruth-Ann Darnall is chair of the Peace Valley Association, which was formed in 1975 to ensure the preservation of the Peace River Valley.

(No website; she lives in Fort St John)